by Majid FakhryFirst published in The Muslim World, 47:1957, pp. 133-145
After Wensinck’s brilliant study,
a fresh examination of the argument for the existence of God in Islam
might appear impertinent. Some justification for the present discussion,
however, may be found in the fact that some of the material on which
this study is based was not available to Wensinck, when his monograph
appeared in 1936, and in the slightly different interpretation of
certain relevant data here attempted.
The systematic examination of the proofs of the existence of God
should be preceded by a legitimate enquiry: Is the demonstration of
God’s existence possible at all? In the Latin scholastic treatises of
the Middle Ages, as for example in the
Summa Theologica of St.
Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) this enquiry figures as the prelude to the
demonstration of God’s existence proper. Although Wensinck has discussed
some aspects of the problem of knowledge (
erkenntnislehre) in his celebrated
Muslim Creed,
he does not touch upon this particular aspect of the problem in his
monograph, except incidentally, as, for example, in connection with
Al-Ghazali’s attitude to the question of God’s existence. But this question, it would seem, requires a fuller treatment than is accorded it in that parenthesis.
In his two little tracts;
Fasl al-Maqal and
al-Kashf ‘an Manahij al-Adillah, Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) raises this question in a systematic way. In the former tract, he is concerned with a wider problem:
viz.
Whether the philosophical method tallies with the teaching of
revelation or not –- to which he replies in the affirmative. “For if the
aim of philosophy,” he writes, “is nothing other than the consideration
of existing things and their examination, in so far as they manifest
the Creator —
viz. in so far as they created objects…revelation (
al-shar’) definitely enjoins the consideration of existing things and commends it” -– a thesis which he supports by a wealth of Qur’anic quotations. When he returns to this question at the beginning of
Al-Khasf, he distinguishes between three schools of thought on the specific problem of God’s existence:
(1) The Literalist who reject rational argument altogether and claim that God’s existence can be known by means of authority (
al-sam‘) only.
(2) The Ash‘arites (with whom he includes the Mu‘tazilites) who admit
the possibility of a rational demonstration of the existence of God
from the concepts of temporality (
huduth) or contingency (
jawaz), as we will see later and;
(3) finally the Sufis who claim that we apprehend God directly but
“whose method,” as Ibn Rushd observes, “is not speculative at all” and
which, even if its validity is conceded, is not common to all men.
